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INVESTOR REACTION IN STOCK MARKET CRASHES 
AND POST-CRASH MARKET REVERSALS 
Daniel Folkinshteyn, Rowan University 
Gulser Meric, Rowan University 
Ilhan Meric, Rider University 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
We study investor overreaction using data for five major stock market crashes during the 1987-2008 
period. We find some evidence of investor overreaction in all five stock market crashes. The prices of 
stocks investors bid down more than the average during crashes tend to increase more than the average 
in post-crash market reversals. In line with CAPM, we find that high beta stocks lose more value in 
crashes and gain more value in post-crash market reversals relative to low beta stocks. We further find 
that smaller firms and those with a low market-to-book ratio lose more value in stock market crashes. 
However, they do not gain more value in post-crash market reversals, implying that investor reaction 
against these firms in stock market crashes is not an overreaction. In examining industry-specific 
behavior, our results indicate that investors overbid down the prices of high-tech stocks in the 1997 crash 
and manufacturing stocks in the 2008 crash relative to other stocks. However, the prices of stocks in these 
industries increased more than other stocks in the post-crash market reversals, implying investor 
overreaction for these industries in these stock market crashes. 
 
JEL: G00, G01, G10, G14 
 
KEYWORDS: Stock Market Crash, Post-Crash Market Reversal, Determinants of Stock Returns,     
  Investor Overreaction  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n this paper, we study investor overreaction using data for five major stock market crashes during the 
1987-2008 period. A stock market crash is commonly defined as a sudden dramatic decline of stock 
prices across a significant cross-section of a stock market. There is no generally accepted threshold 
for duration or magnitude for the decline in stock prices. Wang et al. (2009) and Gulko (2002) define a 
stock market crash as 5% or greater decrease in stock prices in a single trading day. In this paper, we 
study the stock market crashes with a minimum of 9.8% cumulative decline in stock prices in several 
consecutive trading days.  
 
Stock market crashes are generally followed by several days of sharp market reversal. If there is an 
overreaction towards stocks with certain financial characteristics during a crash, the reaction is reversed 
with a sharp market correction during the post-crash market reversal period. For instance, Wang et al. 
(2013) find that investors overreacted to the technical insolvency risk and bankruptcy risk characteristics 
of firms by bidding down their stock prices sharply in the 2008 crash. These stocks gained more value 
relative to other stocks in the post-crash market reversal. In this study, following the methodology used in 
Wang et al. (2013), we compare the crash and post-crash market reversal periods to determine if there was 
any investor overreaction in the five most important stock market crashes of the 1987-2008 period. The 
crash and post-crash market reversal periods included in the study are presented in Table 1. 
 
 
I 
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Table 1: Crash and Recovery Event Characteristics 
 
Event Crash dates Crash return (%) Recovery dates Recovery return (%) 
October 1987 Oct 14 – Oct 19 -28.51   Oct 20 – Oct 21 +14.92   
October 1997 Oct 22 – Oct 27 -9.80   Oct 28 +5.12   
August 1998 Aug 26 – Aug 31 -12.41   Sep 1 +3.86   
April 2000 Apr 10 – Apr 14 -10.54   Apr 17 – Apr 18 +6.27   
October 2008 Oct 1 – Oct 10 -22.90   Oct 13 +11.58   
This table details the five crash and recovery events that are the subject of this study. Included are the dates for crash and recovery, as well as the 
S&P 500 index returns for each. 
 
Our research makes several important contributions to the literature. We document a consistent pattern of 
investor overreaction in a large cross-sectional sample across five of the most significant stock market 
crashes of the past three decades. We also find that different stock characteristics had varying impact on 
the magnitude of overreaction among the events included in our study. The paper is organized as follows: 
The next section examines prior related literature. We then provide information about our data and 
methodology, and follow with a presentation of our results on stock market crashes during the crash and 
recovery periods. In the final section, we conclude the paper and note suggestions for future research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Stock market crashes have received considerable attention in finance literature. Arshanapalli and Doukas 
(1993) and Lau and McInish (1993) study the co-movements of the world’s stock markets before and after 
the 1987 stock market crash. Roll (1988) and Pan et al. (2001) study the effects of emerging markets in 
stock market crashes. Wang et al. (2009 and 2010) study the determinants of stock returns in stock market 
crashes.   De Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) argue that investors tend to overreact to economic events. 
Chopra et al. (1992), Rozeff and Zaman (1998), Bauman et al. (1999) and others provide empirical 
evidence for investor overreaction. In a recent article, Wang et al (2013) demonstrate that investors 
overreacted to the bankruptcy risk and technical insolvency risk characteristics of firms in the 2008 stock 
market crash. There are many possible explanations for this 'investor overreaction' phenomenon, from 
behavioral sentiment issues (Baker, Wurgler, 2006; Barberis, et al., 1998), to herding (Puckett, Yan, 2008) 
to market microstructure constraints (Park, 1995; Kaul, Nimalendran, 1990; Atkins, Dyl, 1990), to 
appropriate response to changing risk (Brown et al., 1993).  
 
Dreman and Lufkin (2000) conclude that investor overreaction is psychological. Amini et al. (2013) 
present an overview of the literature on price reversals.  Analysis of price reversals accompanying issue-
specific public news or lack thereof on a shorter time frame tends to find evidence of overreaction (e.g. 
Chan, 2003; Larson, 2003; Bremer, Sweeney, 1991). Chopra et al. (1992) examine a longer time frame 
and also conclude there is evidence of overreaction. While some researchers attempt to measure investor 
sentiment directly (Baker, Wurgler, 2006), in this study we follow most prior research and focus on the 
price movements and company financials to investigate the issue of investor overreaction in general stock 
market crashes with data for the five most important stock market crashes during the 1987-2008 period. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The daily stock trading prices, used in the calculation of daily returns, are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The 'crash return' is defined as the cumulative return over 
several consecutive daily price decreases in the S&P 500 index during the crash event. The 'recovery 
return' is defined as the cumulative return over several consecutive daily price increases in the S&P 500 
index immediately following the crash event. We use the event study methodology and calculate the 
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cumulative stock returns during the crash and recovery windows using trading price data. We compute the 
CAPM betas of the stocks using the daily stock returns for the past 90 calendar days and the CRSP-
provided returns on a value-weighted index which includes NYSE, NASDAQ, and ARCA securities. 
Firms with missing trading prices on key event dates and those with fewer than 30 trading quotes in the 
past 90 calendar days are excluded from the sample. Following Wang et al. (2009), we also exclude firms 
with a trading price of less than one dollar. We use the Research Insight (COMPUSTAT) quarterly 
database to collect balance-sheet information on the individual securities. For each security and each 
event, we select the latest available COMPUSTAT quarterly observation within the year prior to the start 
of the event. Firms with missing data are excluded from the sample. 
 
The study by Wang et al. (2013) finds that investors overreacted to the technical insolvency risk and 
bankruptcy risk characteristics of firms in the 2008 stock market crash. The current ratio measures the 
ability of a firm to meet its maturing obligations and is a standard measure of technical insolvency risk 
(see: Wang et al, 2013). The debt ratio is commonly used in empirical studies as a measure of firm 
bankruptcy risk (see, e.g., Mitton, 2002; Baek et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2013). The current ratio and the 
debt ratio are the two key financial ratios used in Ohlson’s (1980) bankruptcy prediction model. We use 
these two financial ratios in our empirical tests to study investor reaction to technical insolvency risk and 
bankruptcy risk characteristics of firms in the five stock market crashes and post-crash market reversals 
included in the paper. Sharpe’s CAPM has been generally tested with data for normal time periods. Beta 
has not been studied sufficiently as a determinant of stock returns in stock market crashes and post-crash 
market reversals. We use beta as a control variable in our empirical tests and we study if it was a 
significant determinant of stock returns in the stock market crashes and post-crash market reversals 
included in the paper. In their three-factor CAPM, in addition to beta, Fama and French (1992, 1993) use 
firm size and the market-to-book ratio as determinants of stock returns. In our empirical tests, we also use 
these two variables as controls and investigate if they were significant determinants of stock returns in the 
stock market crashes and post-crash market reversals included in the study.  
 
Industry dummy variables are commonly used in cross-sectional studies of stock returns (see, e.g., 
Mitton, 2002; Baek at al., 2004; Wang et al., 2009). To control for the industry effect, we construct five 
broad industry portfolios (French, 2008) based on SIC codes. The portfolios are 'cnsmr', including 
consumer durables, nondurables, wholesale, retail, and some services; 'manuf', including manufacturing, 
energy, and utilities; 'hitec', including business equipment, telephone and television transmission; 'hlth', 
including healthcare, medical equipment, and drugs; and 'allother', which includes mines, construction, 
building materials, transportation, hotels, business services, entertainment, and finance. Utility firms' 
financial decisions are affected by regulation, while financial firm financial ratios are not comparable to 
those of other firms. Therefore, following Fama and French (2001, 2002), Gadarowski et al. (2007), and 
Wang (2009 and 2013), we exclude utilities (SIC code 4900-4999) and financial firms (SIC code 6000-
6999) from our sample. The data items used in the study from the CRSP and COMPUSTAT databases are 
presented in Table 2. We list the variables constructed with the data in Table 3. After excluding 
observations with missing values, we winsorize extreme values using robust median-based measures of 
center and scale. At the end, we have 2591 observations for 1987, 4642 observations for 1997, 4443 
observations for 1998, 4442 observations for 2000, and 3277 observations for 2008, a total of 19395 
observations for the entire sample.  
 
The descriptive statistics for the sample are presented in Table 4. The statistics in the table show a pattern 
of growing firm size over time, both in terms of total assets and market cap. Mean total assets gradually 
increases from 968 million in 1987 to 5,184 million in 2008, which is expected given the general growth 
of the economy as well as dollar inflation over the time period. The mean current ratio steadily grows 
from 2.8 in 1987 to 3.06 in 2000, then drops back down to 2.77 in 2008. The mean debt-to-equity ratio 
starts out high at 1.34 in 1987, decreases to 1.25 in 1997, then gradually increases to 1.29 by 2008. The 
crash and recovery returns are highly variable within each event sample showing that, even during 
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significant overall market moves, there is wide variation in the performance of individual stocks. 
 
Table 2: Data Items Used in the Study 
 
Variable Source Description 
Indtret CRSP Combined index return, including NYSE, Nasdaq, ARCA 
Adjtprc CRSP Adjusted trading price, present only if trades occurred during the day 
Tprc CRSP Trading price, present only if trades occurred during the day 
SIC CRSP SIC code 
TCap CRSP Market cap, in thousands (rescaled to millions for convenience) 
ACTQ COMPUSTAT Total current assets, in millions 
LCTQ COMPUSTAT Total current liabilities, in millions 
LTQ COMPUSTAT Total liabilities, in millions 
ATQ COMPUSTAT Total assets, in millions 
This table lists all the data items used in this study, along with their descriptions and source databases. 
 
Table 3: Constructed Variables Used in the Study 
 
Variable Description 
crash.return Simple total return for the 'crash' period for each event. 
recovery.return Simple total return for the 'recovery' period for each event. 
beta Stock beta calculated over the past 90 calendar days of daily stock data. 
mkbk Market to book equity ratio. TCap / (ATQ – LTQ) 
dr Debt to equity ratio. LTQ / (ATQ – LTQ) 
cr Current ratio. ACTQ / LCTQ 
cnsmr Dummy variable set to 1 for the 'consumer' industry portfolio. 
manuf Dummy variable set to 1 for the 'manufacturing' industry portfolio. 
hitec Dummy variable set to 1 for the 'high technology' industry portfolio. 
hlth Dummy variable set to 1 for the 'healthcare' industry portfolio. 
This table lists all the constructed variables used in this study, along with their detailed descriptions. 
 
We use the following multivariate regression model for each of the five crash events with the dependent 
variable as the crash return:  
 
crash.return = a0 +a1beta + a2TCap + a3mkbk + a4dr + a5cr +  
  + a6cnsmr + a7hitec + a8hlth + a9manuf + ɛ          (1) 
 
where a0 is a constant (the intercept term), ɛ is the error term, and a1, a2, … a9  are the regression 
coefficients. The independent variables in the model are beta (beta), size (TCap), market-to-book ratio 
(mkbk), debt-to-equity ratio (dr), current ratio (cr), and the dummy variables for the industry portfolios 
(cnsmr, hitec, hlth, and manuf). The effect of the fifth portfolio, allother, is left in the intercept.  We use 
the following multivariate regression model for each of the five post-crash market reversal events with the 
dependent variable as the recovery return:  
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Min 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max StDev 
Panel 1: October 1987 crash (N = 2591) 
ATQ  1.149   31.832   91.966   816.51   316.44  70011   3563.8  
LTQ  0.0780  12.045   41.785   453.38   160.12  37783   2000.2  
TCap  1.464   30.892   83.050   770.58   320.23  90131   3393.4  
cr  0.0087  1.556   2.234   2.913   3.418  10.280   2.134  
dr 0.0106 0.4826 0.9761 1.306  1.636  5.978  1.221  
mkbk  0.0058  1.337   1.999   2.578   3.109  11.733   2.024  
beta -2.388   0.1750  0.5484  0.5738  0.9545  4.553   0.6293 
crash.return -0.6316 -0.2609 -0.1905 -0.1931 -0.1228  0.5532  0.1020 
recovery.return -0.4576 -0.0837 -0.0282 -0.0130  0.0428  0.6667  0.1146 
Panel 2: October 1997 Crash (N = 4642) 
ATQ  1.441   36.252   108.82   1051.8   449.40  97123   4393.2 
LTQ  0.0260  9.947   40.838   610.93   230.78  58537   2701.8 
TCap  1.832   54.739   165.41   1480.1   617.79  167169   7473.1 
cr  0.0271  1.452   2.229   2.998   3.572  10.280   2.369 
dr 0.0006 0.344  0.7755 1.213  1.552  5.978  1.310 
mkbk  0.0029  1.710   2.800   3.747   4.768  11.733   2.932 
beta -5.023   0.0694  0.4545  0.4323  0.8180  4.833   0.6817 
crash.return -0.5000 -0.1299 -0.0798 -0.0862 -0.0385  0.4884  0.0768 
recovery.return -0.3824 -0.0134  0.0155  0.0237  0.0558  0.4444  0.0618 
Panel 3: August 1998 Crash (N = 4443) 
ATQ     1.605    43.629   137.94  1217.4   561.02 93216  4661.2 
LTQ     0.0470    12.086    51.172   712.19   289.75 58535  2839.1 
TCap      1.482     44.312    139.24   1650.2    530.50 280297   9682.6 
cr  0.0580  1.485  2.257  3.051  3.648 10.280  2.397 
dr 0.0011 0.3489 0.7932 1.229 1.576 5.978 1.319 
mkbk  0.0030  1.184  1.965  2.888  3.512 11.733  2.667 
beta -4.390  0.3863  0.7696  0.7988  1.179  3.778  0.6648 
crash.return -0.6826 -0.2048 -0.1349 -0.1439 -0.0769  0.5476  0.1011 
recovery.return -0.4326 -0.0192  0.0141  0.0227  0.0583  1.500  0.0852 
Panel 4: April 2000 Crash (N = 4442) 
ATQ      1.786     51.508    176.84   1709.5    685.69 244192   8340.4 
LTQ      0.0230     13.711     59.798    960.33    333.68 114871   4524.9 
TCap      1.379     57.436    228.02   3019.5    915.03 490266  18498 
cr  0.0447  1.397  2.210  3.161  3.798 10.280  2.619 
dr 0.0008 0.3078 0.7918 1.230 1.594 5.978 1.334 
mkbk  0.0011  1.120  2.364  3.928  5.645 11.733  3.698 
beta -3.641  0.1954  0.5736  0.6757  1.095  4.989  0.7540 
crash.return -0.7903 -0.2777 -0.1309 -0.1643 -0.0366  0.5000  0.1627 
recovery.return -0.5000 -0.0166  0.0250  0.0509  0.1021  1.250  0.1279 
Panel 5: October 2008 Crash (N = 3277) 
ATQ      1.680    138.62    507.64   4962.0   2150.9 342679  19707 
LTQ      0.0090     38.369    200.83   2812.1   1155.7 200770  11704 
TCap      0.5337    113.40    414.16   3425.6   1568.4 403366  14974 
cr  0.0000  1.343  2.077  2.828  3.366 10.280  2.294 
dr 0.0003 0.3633 0.8211 1.252 1.556 5.978 1.338 
mkbk  0.0021  0.9472  1.629  2.410  2.912 11.733  2.425 
beta -1.328  0.5052  0.8322  0.8328  1.138  3.076  0.5048 
crash.return -0.8080 -0.3386 -0.2441 -0.2542 -0.1697  0.4119  0.1338 
recovery.return -0.4110  0.0461  0.0960  0.1061  0.1532  1.100  0.0982 
Panel 6: All Data (N = 19395) 
ATQ      1.149     46.394    160.85   1869.6    691.11 342679   9739.2 
LTQ      0.0090     13.787     60.454   1065.0    339.91 200770   5709.7 
TCap      0.5337     52.760    181.69   2105.6    736.12 490266  12388 
cr  0.0000  1.443  2.206  3.007  3.594 10.280  2.396 
dr 0.0003 0.3575 0.8221 1.239 1.581 5.978 1.311 
mkbk  0.0011  1.233  2.167  3.210  3.970 11.733  2.955 
beta -5.023  0.2434  0.6337  0.6586  1.043  4.989  0.6793 
crash.return -0.8080 -0.2375 -0.1398 -0.1600 -0.0652  0.5532  0.1313 
recovery.return -0.5000 -0.0180  0.0242  0.0387  0.0862  1.500  0.1048 
This table shows the summary statistics of the data samples for the five individual crash events in Panels 1-5, in chronological order, and for all 
data aggregated together in Panel 6. Included are the minimum, first quartile, median, mean, third quartile, maximum, and standard deviation. 
All variables are as defined earlier in Tables 2 and 3. 
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recovery.return = b0 + b1crash.return + b2beta + b3TCap + b4mkbk + b5dr +  
  + b6cr + b7cnsmr + b8hitec + b9hlth + b10manuf + e     (2) 
 
where b0 is a constant (the intercept term), e is the error term, and b1, b2, … b10  are the regression 
coefficients. The independent variables of Model (2) are the same as in Model (1) except the crash returns 
(crash.return) variable. Crash returns are used as an independent variable in Model (2) to determine if 
crash returns can explain post crash returns.  
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Crash Periods 
 
The multivariate regression analysis results for the five crash periods using Equation (1) are presented in 
Table 5. The F statistics indicate that all five regressions in the table are statistically significant. The 
explanatory power of the model varies between the events with the adjusted R-squared ranging from a 
low of 8.5 percent for 1997 to 44.9 percent for 2000. For all the events, the regression coefficient of beta 
is significant and negative, which indicates that stocks with a higher beta lost more value in all five stock 
market crashes relative to lower beta stocks. This result is in line with the CAPM, which predicts that 
stocks with higher betas would lose more value in down markets relative to low beta stocks. The 
regression coefficient of the size (TCap) variable is significant with a negative sign for the 1987 crash and 
with a positive sign for the 1998, 2000, and 2008 crashes. It is not statistically significant for the 1997 
crash. The Fama and French (1992, 1993) three-factor CAPM argues that large firms are less risky than 
smaller firms. Therefore, the TCap variable should have a positive sign in a stock market crash. The 1998, 
2000, and 2008 results confirm the prediction of the model. However, our results indicate that larger firms 
lost more value compared with smaller firms in the 1987 crash. There was a major market correction in 
stock prices in the 1987 crash. Investors might have thought that large firm stocks were more overvalued 
compared with small company stocks prior to the crash.   
 
The regression coefficient of the market-to-book (mkbk) variable is significant with a negative sign for 
the 1987, 1997, 1998 and 2000 crashes and with a positive sign for the 2008 crash. According to Fama 
and French’s (1992, 1993) three-factor CAPM, the market-to-book ratio is a risk factor in capital-asset 
pricing. A low market-to-book ratio implies that the firm may be in financial distress. These firms are 
expected to perform worse compared with high market-to-book firms in stock market crashes. Our 
regression result for the 2008 crash confirms the theory’s prediction. However, the results for the 1987, 
1997, 1998, and 2000 crashes do not support the theory’s prediction. Wang et al. (2013) determine that 
bankruptcy risk was a serious concern for investors in the 2008 crash. Therefore, we find that firms with a 
low market-to-book ratio and greater risk lost more value in the 2008 crash. In the 1987, 1997, 1998, and 
2000 crashes, however, perhaps investors considered firms with a high market-to-book ratio to be 
overvalued prior to crash and they simply bid down their prices more relative to low market-to-book ratio 
firms during the crash. 
 
Our findings with the debt-to-equity (dr) variable also confirm our conclusion with the size (TCap) and 
mkbk variables. Bankruptcy risk was a significant concern for investors in the 2008 crash. Therefore, 
firms with a smaller size, lower mkbk, and higher dr lost more value in the 2008 crash. However, the dr 
variable is significant with a positive sign in the 1997, 1998, and 2000 crashes. Firms with a high dr 
performed better in these crashes relative to low dr firms. Since technical insolvency risk and bankruptcy 
risk were significant concerns for investors in the 2008 crash, like the dr variable, the current ratio (cr) 
variable is also significant for the 2008 crash with a positive sign. Firms with a higher cr (i.e., firms with 
a better ability to meet their maturing obligations) lost less value in the 2008 crash. We find a similar 
result for the 1987 crash. However, the sign of the cr variable is significant but negative for the 1998 and 
2000 crashes. Firms with more investment in less profitable liquid assets lost more value in these crashes. 
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The regression coefficients for the industry dummy variables indicate that there is significant variation 
ithe industry effect between the five crash events. With the exception of the 1987 crash, it appears that the 
consumer goods industry segment (cnsmr) generally performed better during crashes with positive and 
significant regression coefficients. Firms in the 'hitec' industry group performed better than the average in 
the 2008 crash and worse than the average in the 1997, 1998 and 2000 crashes. The healthcare (hlth) 
industry regression coefficient is significant only for the 1987 and 2000 crashes with firms in this industry 
underperforming the average in the former and outperforming the average in the latter event. The 
regression coefficient for the manufacturing (manuf) industry segment is positive and significant for 
1997, 1998, and 2000, and negative for 2008, indicating that manufacturing firms performed better than 
the average in the 1997,1998, and 2000 crashes and worse than the average in the 2008 crash.  We 
observe a pattern of opposition between the effects of the hitec and manuf industry sectors in stock 
market crashes. Whenever the regression coefficient of one is positive the other is negative, and vice 
versa. The cnsmr sector appears to perform consistently better than the average in crashes.  
 
Table 5: Multivariate Regression Analysis Results for the Crash Events 
 
 Dependent Variable: Crash.Return 
 1987 1997 1998 2000 2008 
 Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF 
Intercept  -0.1473 ***  
 ( -21.271 ) 
   -0.0737 ***  
 ( -19.509 ) 
   -0.1069 ***  
 ( -20.962 ) 
   -0.0685 ***  
 ( -11.165 ) 
   -0.2271 ***  
 ( -29.607 ) 
  
beta  -0.0513 ***  
 ( -16.916 ) 
1.072  -0.0147 ***  
 (  -9.027 ) 
1.053  -0.0327 ***  
 ( -14.722 ) 
1.051  -0.0438 ***  
 ( -15.922 ) 
1.313  -0.0528 ***  
 ( -11.641 ) 
1.081 
TCap  -0.0024 ***  
 (  -4.274 ) 
1.059   0.0000         
 (   0.3134 ) 
1.060   0.0006 ***  
 (   3.745 ) 
1.063   0.0008 ***  
 (   7.863 ) 
1.050   0.0003 **    
 (   2.170 ) 
1.029 
mkbk  -0.0063 ***  
 (  -6.709 ) 
1.078  -0.0036 ***  
 (  -9.197 ) 
1.161  -0.0046 ***  
 (  -7.804 ) 
1.197  -0.0133 ***  
 ( -22.522 ) 
1.449   0.0057 ***  
 (   5.742 ) 
1.191 
dr  -0.0013         
 (  -0.7928 ) 
1.210   0.0061 ***  
 (   6.485 ) 
1.302   0.0027 **    
 (   2.203 ) 
1.279   0.0106 ***  
 (   6.894 ) 
1.275  -0.0109 ***  
 (  -5.647 ) 
1.376 
cr   0.0026 ***  
 (   2.637 ) 
1.278  -0.0003         
 (  -0.5933 ) 
1.349  -0.0014 **    
 (  -2.024 ) 
1.275  -0.0089 ***  
 ( -10.937 ) 
1.395   0.0041 ***  
 (   3.783 ) 
1.271 
cnsmr  -0.0020         
 (  -0.329 ) 
1.168   0.0135 ***  
 (   3.652 ) 
1.216   0.0181 ***  
 (   3.677 ) 
1.187   0.0292 ***  
 (   4.695 ) 
1.356   0.0277 ***  
 (   3.914 ) 
1.171 
hitec  -0.0074         
 (  -1.164 ) 
1.168  -0.0163 ***  
 (  -4.481 ) 
1.216  -0.0142 ***  
 (  -2.952 ) 
1.187  -0.0569 ***  
 (  -9.313 ) 
1.356   0.0197 ***  
 (   2.954 ) 
1.171 
hlth  -0.0257 ***  
 (  -3.127 ) 
1.168   0.0048         
 (   1.070 ) 
1.216  -0.0009         
 (  -0.1613 ) 
1.187   0.0188 **    
 (   2.516 ) 
1.356   0.0018         
 (   0.2137 ) 
1.171 
manuf   0.0015         
 (   0.2521 ) 
1.168   0.0095 **    
 (   2.520 ) 
1.216   0.0118 **    
 (   2.348 ) 
1.187   0.0519 ***  
 (   7.998 ) 
1.356  -0.0342 ***  
 (  -4.832 ) 
1.171 
N 2591   4642   4443   4442   3277   
Adj. R-squared 0.1530   0.0853   0.1002   0.4492   0.1142   
F statistic 52.974 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  49.092 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  55.981 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  403.36 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  47.922 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  
This table shows the results of multiple regression analysis on the data for the individual events. The dependent variable is the crash return, and 
the independent variables are as listed in the table in the leftmost column. The regression specification is as follows: crash.return = a0 +a1beta + 
a2TCap + a3mkbk + a4dr + a5cr + a6cnsmr + a7hitec + a8hlth + a9manuf + ɛ Each column shows the regression results for one of the events, left 
to right in chronological order, as labeled. Shown are the coefficients with significance indicators, and t-statistics below in parentheses. All 
variables are as defined earlier in Tables 2 and 3, but with TCap rescaled to billions. The last three rows list the number of observations, the 
adjusted R-squared, and the F statistic (with p-value in parentheses), for each of the regressions.  The variance inflation factors (VIF) are listed 
to the right of each coefficient for each regression. The VIF is used to test for multicollinearity in the model. Prior literature suggests that there is 
no major multicollinearity associated with a variable if the VIF value is less than 10 (Belsley et al., 2009). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 
1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
D. Folkinshteyn et al | IJBFR ♦ Vol. 9 ♦ No. 5 ♦ 2015  
 
64 
 
Post-Crash Market Reversal Periods 
 
The results of the regressions specified by Equation (2) are shown in Table 6. The F statistics indicate that 
all five regressions are statistically significant. The explanatory power of the model varies between the 
events but is on average higher than in the crash regressions with the adjusted R-squared ranging from a 
14.7 percent for 1998 to 36.5 percent for 2000. 
 
Table 6: Multivariate Regression Analysis Results for the Post-Crash Market Reversal Events 
 
 Dependent Variable: Recovery.Return 
 1987 1997 1998 2000 2008 
 Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF Result VIF 
Intercept -0.1407 ***  
(-19.266 ) 
  -0.0188 ***  
(-6.435 ) 
  -0.0226 ***  
(-5.159 ) 
  -0.0214 ***  
(-3.749 ) 
  -0.0043 
(-0.7503 ) 
  
crash.return -0.6303 ***  
(-32.912 ) 
1.185 -0.3346 ***  
( -30.672 ) 
1.095 -0.2936 ***  
(-23.842 ) 
1.114 -0.3016 ***  
(-21.848 ) 
1.819 -0.3111 ***  
( -26.534 ) 
1.132 
beta -0.0024 
 (-0.7661 ) 
1.190 0.0062 ***  
(5.097 ) 
1.072 0.0097 ***  
(5.214 ) 
1.103 0.0156 ***  
(5.997 ) 
1.388 0.0304 ***  
(9.808 ) 
1.126 
TCap 0.0054 ***  
 (9.809 ) 
1.066 0.0003 ***  
(2.995 ) 
1.060 0.0003 ***  
(2.775 ) 
1.067 0.0002 **    
(2.281 ) 
1.064 0.0003 ***  
(3.346 ) 
1.031 
mkbk 0.0004 
(0.3911 ) 
1.097 0.0017 ***  
(5.613 ) 
1.183 0.0008 * 
(1.693 ) 
1.213 0.0026 ***  
(4.615 ) 
1.615 0.0022 ***  
(3.267 ) 
1.203 
dr -0.0007 
(-0.4099 ) 
1.210 -0.0012 * 
(-1.784 ) 
1.314 -0.0028 ***  
(-2.751 ) 
1.280 -0.0026 * 
(-1.803 ) 
1.288 -0.0020 
(-1.566 ) 
1.389 
cr -0.0012 
(-1.304 ) 
1.282 -0.0002 
(-0.4664 ) 
1.349  -0.0004         
 (  -0.6623 ) 
1.276 0.0006 
(0.7674 ) 
1.432 -0.0006 
(-0.7816 ) 
1.277 
cnsmr 0.0148 ** 
(2.514 ) 
1.174 0.0084 *** 
(3.075 ) 
1.246 -0.0020 
(-0.4876 ) 
1.206 0.0015 
(0.2597 ) 
1.495 -0.0127 ***  
(-2.666 ) 
1.207 
hitec -0.0045 
(-0.7287 ) 
1.174 0.0103 *** 
(3.808 ) 
1.246 -0.0055 
(-1.387 ) 
1.206 0.0079 
(1.395 ) 
1.495 0.0072 
(1.609 ) 
1.207 
hlth -0.0024 
(-0.2971 ) 
1.174 0.0056 * 
(1.689 ) 
1.246 0.0023 
(0.4889 ) 
1.206 -0.0207 ***  
(-3.008 ) 
1.495 0.0058 
(1.037 ) 
1.207 
manuf 0.0144 ** 
(2.446) 
1.174 0.0029 
(1.037 ) 
1.246 -0.0063 
(-1.534 ) 
1.206 0.0104 * 
(1.735 ) 
1.495 0.0175 ***  
(3.677 ) 
1.207 
N 2591   4642   4443   4442   3277   
Adj. R-squared 0.3655   0.2203   0.1473   0.2476   0.2604   
F statistic 150.22 ***  
(0.0000 ) 
  132.14 ***  
(0.0000 ) 
  77.748 ***  
(0.0000 ) 
  147.17 ***  
(0.0000 ) 
  116.34 ***  
(0.0000 ) 
  
This table shows the results of multiple regression analysis on the data for the individual events. The dependent variable is the recovery return, 
and the independent variables are as listed in the table in the leftmost column. The regression specification is as follows: recovery.return = b0 + 
b1crash return + b2beta + b3TCap + b4mkbk + b5dr + b6cr  + b7cnsmr + b8hitec + b9hlth + b10manuf + e Each column shows the regression 
results for one of the events, left to right in chronological order, as labeled. Shown are the coefficients with significance indicators, and t-statistics 
below in parentheses. All variables are as defined earlier in Tables 2 and 3, but with TCap rescaled to billions. The last three rows list the number 
of observations, the adjusted R-squared, and the F statistic (with p-value in parentheses), for each of the regressions.  The variance inflation 
factors (VIF) are listed to the right of each coefficient for each regression. The VIF is used to test for multicollinearity in the model. Prior 
literature suggests that there is no major multicollinearity associated with a variable if the VIF value is less than 10 (Belsley et al., 2009). 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
For all the events, the regression coefficient of the crash return variable is significant with a negative sign 
indicating that firms that experience a larger negative return during the crash period make up for it with a 
larger positive return in the post-crash market reversal. It implies investor overreaction during the crash 
period with a significant market correction in the post-crash market reversal.  
The International Journal of Business and Finance Research ♦ VOLUME 9 ♦ NUMBER 5 ♦ 2015 
 
65 
 
The regression coefficient of beta is significant with a positive sign for all events except the 1987 post-
crash market reversal event. The 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2008 results are in line with the prediction of the 
CAPM. The model predicts that stocks with higher betas earn higher returns relative to low beta stocks in 
up markets.  The regression coefficient of size (TCap) is significant with a positive sign for all post-crash 
market reversal events (i.e., large company stocks outperform small company stocks in all post-crash 
market reversals). This result is in line with the prediction of the Fama-French (1992, 1993) three-factor 
CAPM. The regression coefficient of the market-to-book ratio (mkbk) is positive and significant for all 
post-crash market reversal events except the 1987 event. The 1997, 1998, 2000, and 2008 results are in 
line with the prediction of the Fama-French model. The model predicts that high market-to-book stocks 
would outperform low market-to-book stocks in up markets.   
 
The regression coefficient of the debt-to-equity ratio (dr) is negative and significant for the 1997, 1998, 
and 2000 market reversal events. Since these coefficients are positive and significant during the crash, it 
implies that investors overreacted by bidding down the prices of low dr firm stocks too much in these 
crashes, which resulted in a significant market correction after the crash. The regression coefficients for 
the current ratio (cr) variable are statistically insignificant in all five post-crash market reversal events. It 
implies that there was no investor overreaction to the cr variable in the market crashes which would have 
resulted in a significant market correction in the post-crash market reversal. The signs and significance of 
the regression coefficients for the industry portfolios vary between the events. The industry effect appears 
to be generally less significant in the post-crash market reversal period than in the crash period. The 
results imply investor overreaction in the hitec industry in the 1997 crash and in the manuf industry in the 
2008 crash. Stocks that lost more value than the average in the hitec industry in the 1997 crash and in the 
manuf industry in the 2008 crash gained more value than the other stocks in the post-crash market 
reversal.   
 
Combined Data for All Five Crashes 
 
Although the five stock market crash events have a number of distinct characteristics, running regressions 
with the combined sample may provide some useful insights about the overall mean effects of the 
variables across all crashes. We present our regression results with the entire data set for all five market 
crash and post-crash market reversal events in Table 7. The F statistics indicate that both the crash 
regression and the post-crash market reversal regression are statistically significant at the 1-percent level.  
 
The regression coefficient of the crash return variable is significant with a negative sign for the post-crash 
market reversal. It indicates that stocks that lose more value in crashes tend to gain more value in post-
crash market reversals. It implies investor overreaction in stock market crashes. The regression coefficient 
of beta is significant in both regressions and it has a negative sign for the crash and a positive sign for the 
post-crash market reversal. It implies that stocks with higher betas lose more value in crashes and they 
gain more value in post-crash market reversals relative to low beta stocks. This finding is in line with the 
prediction of the CAPM that high beta stocks lose more value in down markets and gain more value in up 
markets relative to low beta stocks. The regression coefficient of size (TCap) is significant with a positive 
sign in both regressions. It implies that stocks with larger market capitalization perform better compared 
with stocks with smaller market capitalization both in crashes and in post-crash market reversals. This 
finding is in line with the Fama-French (1992, 1993) three-factor CAPM, which argues that large firms 
are less risky and investors require lower returns from these firms.   
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Table 7: Multivariate Regression Analysis Results with All data 
 
 Crash Recovery 
 Result VIF Result VIF 
Intercept  -0.1105 ***  
 ( -37.061 ) 
  -0.0303 ***  
 ( -13.120 ) 
  
crash.return     -0.3533 ***  
 ( -65.620 ) 
1.175 
beta  -0.0596 ***  
 ( -45.334 ) 
1.056   0.0128 ***  
 (  12.327 ) 
1.168 
TCap   0.0003 ***  
 (   3.967 ) 
1.039   0.0005 ***  
 (   8.519 ) 
1.040 
mkbk  -0.0043 ***  
 ( -13.529 ) 
1.173   0.0020 ***  
 (   8.409 ) 
1.184 
dr   0.0027 ***  
 (   3.682 ) 
1.262  -0.0022 ***  
 (  -3.918 ) 
1.263 
cr  -0.0024 ***  
 (  -5.855 ) 
1.311  -0.0008 **    
 (  -2.508 ) 
1.313 
cnsmr   0.0258 ***  
 (   8.855 ) 
1.197   0.0000         
 (  -0.0178 ) 
1.214 
hitec  -0.0131 ***  
 (  -4.573 ) 
1.197   0.0032         
 (   1.490 ) 
1.214 
hlth   0.0108 ***  
 (   3.048 ) 
1.197   0.0004         
 (   0.1694 ) 
1.214 
manuf   0.0165 ***  
 (   5.553 ) 
1.197   0.0036         
 (   1.609 ) 
1.214 
N 19395   19395   
Adj. R-squared 0.1488   0.2487   
F statistic 377.62 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  643.08 ***  
 ( 0.0000 ) 
  
This table shows the results of multiple regression analysis on the entire data sample. In the first column, labeled 'Crash', the dependent variable 
is the crash return, and the independent variables are as listed in the table in the leftmost column: crash.return = a0 +a1beta + a2TCap + a3mkbk 
+ a4dr + a5cr + a6cnsmr + a7hitec + a8hlth + a9manuf + ɛ For the second column, labeled 'Recovery', the dependent variable is the recovery 
return, and the independent variables are as listed in the table in the leftmost column: recovery.return = b0 + b1crash return + b2beta + b3TCap + 
b4mkbk + b5dr + b6cr + b7cnsmr + b8hitec + b9hlth + b10manuf + e Shown are the coefficients with significance indicators, and t-statistics below 
in parentheses. All variables are as defined earlier in Tables 2 and 3, but with TCap rescaled to billions. The last three rows list the number of 
observations, the adjusted R-squared, and the F statistic (with p-value in parentheses), for each of the regressions.  The variance inflation factors 
(VIF) are listed to the right of each coefficient for each regression. The VIF is used to test for multicollinearity in the model. Prior literature 
suggests that there is no major multicollinearity associated with a variable if the VIF value is less than 10 (Belsley et al., 2009). 
 ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
When the regression coefficient of a variable is significant with different signs in the crash and post-crash 
market reversal periods, it implies investor overreaction during the crash. The regression coefficient of the 
mkbk variable is significant in both regressions and it has a negative sign for the crash and a positive sign 
for the post-crash market reversal. It implies that investors consider high mkbk stocks to be overvalued 
prior to crashes and they bid down their prices more relative to low mkbk stocks in stock market crashes. 
However, there is a significant market correction for the prices of high mkbk stocks in the post-crash 
reversals implying investor overreaction towards these stocks during the crash.  
 
The regression coefficient of the debt-to-equity ratio (dr) variable is significant in both regressions and it 
has a positive sign for the crash and a negative sign for the post-crash market reversal implying investor 
overreaction during the crash period. The result implies that the stocks of firms with higher debt ratios 
generally perform better in crashes (excluding the 2008 crash when investors had a serious concern with 
bankruptcy risk) but they perform worse in post-crash market reversals compared with the stocks of firms 
with lower debt ratios.  The regression coefficient of current ratio (cr) is significant with a negative sign in 
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both regressions. It implies that the stocks of firms with more investment in less profitable current assets 
generally perform worse both in crashes and in post-crash market reversals. However, this is an aggregate 
result for all crashes. Because technical insolvency risk was a major concern for investors, low cr firms 
lost more value relative to high cr firms in the 1987 and 2008 stock market crashes (see Table 6). All 
regression coefficients for the industry dummy variables are statistically significant for the crash period. 
The sign of the regression coefficient for the cnsmr, hlth, and manuf industries is positive. It implies that 
the stocks of firms in these industries generally perform better than the average in stock market crashes. 
The sign of the regression coefficient for the hitec industry is negative in the crash regression. It implies 
that the stocks in this industry generally perform worse than the average in crashes. The regression 
coefficients of all four industries are insignificant for the post-crash market reversal period. This implies 
that the stocks in all four industries generally perform similarly in post-crash market reversals with no 
major market correction for any industry to correct an overreaction during the crash periods.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, we study the determinants of stock returns in five major stock market crashes and post-crash 
market reversals during the 1987-2008 period to investigate if there was any investor overreaction in 
these crashes. Using daily closing prices we calculate cumulative returns for the crash and reversal 
periods for the events listed in Table 1, and regress crash and reversal returns on a number of firm 
characteristics. The regression coefficient of the crash return variable is statistically significant with a 
negative sign in all post-crash market reversal regressions. This result implies that there is investor 
overreaction in stock market crashes. Stocks that lose more value in crashes tend to gain more value after 
the crash with a significant market correction in the post-crash market reversal. Sharpe’s CAPM predicts 
that high beta firms lose more value in down markets and gain more value in up markets compared with 
low beta firms. As predicted by the theory, in this paper, we find that high beta companies lose more value 
in stock market crashes and gain more value in post-crash market reversals.  
 
In the Fama-French (1992, 1993) three-factor CAPM, in addition to beta, firm size and market-to-book 
ratio are also market risk factors and determinants of stock returns. The model argues that smaller firms 
and those with lower market-to-book ratios are riskier. Therefore, investors would require a higher rate of 
return with a larger risk premium when valuing these firms. As predicted by the theory, we find that 
smaller firms and those with lower market-to-book ratios lose more value in stock market crashes. 
However, the sign of the regression coefficients for these variables does not change in the post-crash 
market reversals. It implies that investor reaction against smaller and lower market-to-book ratio firms in 
stock market crashes is not an overreaction.  The regression coefficient of the debt ratio (dr) variable is 
significant with a positive sign in the 2008 crash. Since bankruptcy risk was a serious concern for 
investors, high-dr firms lost more value relative to low-dr firms in the 2008 crash. However, the 
regression coefficient for the dr variable is not significant in the post-crash market reversal. It implies that 
investors’ bidding down the prices of high dr firms was not an overreaction in the 2008 crash.  
 
Our crash regressions show that, because technical insolvency risk was an important concern for 
investors, firms with a higher current ratio (cr) and thus greater ability to meet their maturing obligations, 
lost less value relative to lower cr firms in the 1987 and 2008 crashes. However, the regression coefficient 
for the cr variable is not significant in the post-crash market reversal regressions. It implies that investors’ 
bidding down the prices of low cr firms was not an overreaction in the 1987 and 2008 crashes. 
 
The industry dummy variables indicate that there is no specific pattern of industry effect in stock market 
crashes. However, investors appear to have overreacted against high tech stocks in the 1997 crash and 
against manufacturing stocks in the 2008 crash with a significant market correction in the values of these 
stocks in the post-crash market reversals. The present research has several limitations. First, in this study 
we have a relatively short term definition of market crash and reversal, requiring consecutive stock index 
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price declines for the crash, and consecutive increases for the reversal. It would be instructive to look at 
longer-term market crash and reversal periods. Additionally, we only look at U.S. firms; it is possible that 
international markets would exhibit different patterns of investor behavior. Investigating these issues in 
greater detail should be fertile ground for future research. 
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